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STATE CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL INDIANS-
A RE-EXAMINATION
Joel E. Guthals
INTRODUCTION
After the 1971 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Kennerly v. District Court', it appeared that the extent to which Mon-
tana could exercise civil jurisdiction over transactions involving Indians
and their property had been definitively settled. Within a matter of
months, however, what seems to have been clear has become more un-
certain than ever. This note reviews the legislative and judicial pathway
leading to Kennerly, a subsequent Supreme Court opinion attempting
to clarify the meaning of that case, and recent Montana decisions which
may have set the stage for another battle over the extent to and manner
in which a state may extend its civil jurisdiction over tribal Indians.
BACKGROUND
HISToICAL FOUNDATIONS
Two clauses of the United States Constitution have provided the
basis for virtually all litigation concerning the extent of state power
over Indians. Article I, Section 8 provides: "The Congress shall have
Power . . .To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes... 2 Additionally, Article II,
Section 2 by implication gives authority to the President to make treaties
with Indian tribes. 3 The question of whether these grants of authority
preclude the states from enacting statutes which regulate internal reser-
vation affairs was first presented to the Supreme Court in 1832.
In the historic case of Worcester v. Georgia,4 Chief Justice Marshall
ruled that Indian tribes were distinct political communities and as such
could be dealt with only by the federal government. The Chief Justice
held that the Indian nations possessed rights of self-government within
the reservation boundaries established by federal treaties and that no
state could interfere with these rights. Even the federal government
was excluded from interfering with the Indians' inherent right to self-
government unless permitted to do so by treaty or legislation.5 Thus,
'Kennerly v. District Court, 411 U.S. 423 (1971). An excellent and comprehensive
analysis of the question of state jurisdiction over tribal Indians including the Ken-
nerly decision can be found in Sullivan, State Civil Power Over Reservation Indians,
33 MONT. L. REV. 291-306 (1972).
sThis is the only provision in the Constitution which specifically grants authority
over Indians to a governmental branch.
8This authority is inferred from the President's general treaty-making pawer. See,
McClanahan v. State Tax Commissioner of Arizona, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973).
'Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5Id. at 559, 560.
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a Georgia statute punishing "white persons" for living in the Cherokee
nation without a license was declared unconstitutional. 6
The broad principles set forth in Worcester did not remain unvaried.
In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court during the latter
part of the nineteenth century, it was held that states might have juris-
diction over affairs on Indian reservations if the exercise of power did
not directly affect Indian rights.7 The Court, however, remained fairly
consistent in adhering to the Worcester philosophy that state govern-
ments could not extend their power over Indian reservations in such a
way that Indian rights would be infringed.
8
The Worcester doctrine that Indian tribes were separate political
entities was also embodied by the disclaimers found in the statehood
acts and constitutions of Montana and other western states. Typically
each state, as a pre-requisite to admission to the Union, had to disclaim
all right, title, and jurisdiction over lands lying within the boundaries
of Indian reservations. Instead, such authority was to remain exclusively
with the Congress.9 While these disclaimers have received various inter-
pretations,' 0 the policy encompassed therein seems clear-that Congress
was vested with the sole power to alter the basic relationship between
the Indian tribes and the federal and state governments.
In exercising this constitutional grant of power, several Congres-
sional enactments must be noted. Carving away at an 1884 Supreme
Court ruling" that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant state and
federal citizenship to tribal Indians, the Dawes Act of 188712 conferred
citizenship upon certain classes of Indians who had taken up "civilized"
life. Such Indians were to come within the jurisdiction of the state
governments. In 1906, the Burke Act's redefined the time at which an
Indian was to become a citizen and subject to state laws as that date
on which the Indian was granted a patent in fee simple to allotted lands.
An important exclusion to this grant of citizenship was found in a final
provision of the Burke Act:
... Provided further, that until the issuance of fee-simple patents
all allottees to whom trust patents shall be issued shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; . .
Old. at 562.
7See, Sullivan, supra note 1 at 296; see also, Langforth v. Montieth, 102 U.S. 145
(1880); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); Utah and Northern Railway
v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
8See, United States v. Kayama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382 (1886).
OSee, Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 677, which concerned the admis-
sion of the northwestern states of Montana, Washington, North and South Dakota.
IOSee, Sullivan, supra note 1 at 292-294. The Montana diclaimer was given a broad
interpretation in State ex rel. McDonald v. District Court, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d
78, 81 (1972).
"Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
"Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390.
'Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1964).
14Id.
NOTES1974]
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In 1924, Congress granted citizenship to Indians who had not been
made citizens by prior enactment. 15 But the 1924 Act contained an
important proviso which appeared to carry the philosophy of Worcester
into the twentieth century:
*.. Provided, that the granting of citizenship shall not in any man-
ner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or
other property.. "
In interpreting the affect of this series of Congressional enactments
as well as the decisions of the federal courts, the Montana supreme
court noted in 1926 that state jurisdiction over reservation Indians had
not been significantly altered since Worcester:
. . . it would be more exact to say that the United States courts
have always asserted federal jurisdiction and denied state juris-
diction over Indians who are wards of the government residing within
Indian reservations. '
WILLIAmS, KENNERLY AND MCCLANAHAN
By 1953, the Congressional attitude toward exclusive federal juris-
diction over Indian tribes had changed.' Thus, Congress spelled out a
procedure' 9 whereby a state might acquire civil jurisdiction over tribal
Indians who were not subject to state authority by virtue of the citizen-
ship acts passed earlier. The Act provided that the state could assume
jurisdiction by amending its statutes and/or constitution through affirm-
ative legislative action thus indicating its intent to assume such respon-
sbility.20
Five years later the State of Arizona in Williams v. Lee2' attempted
to assume such jurisdiction through judicial reasoning rather than by
legislative fiat. The Arizona court argued that because no Act of Con-
gress forbade them to do so, the Arizona courts could exercise juris-
diction over suits by non-Indians against tribal Indians even though
the action might arise on a reservation. 22 The U.S. Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion reversed the state decision 3 Justice Black stated:
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
'-Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (3) (1970).
""Id.
1 7State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067, 1071 (1926).
18TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN CITIZENs 60-62 (1972), citing House Con-
current Resolution 108 (Aug. 1953).
"Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 503, §§ 6, 7, 67 Stat. 590. The Act is commonly known as
Public Law 280.
2°Id.2
'Williams v. Lee, 81 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
2Id. at 1001.
2Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
"Id. at 220.
[Vol. 35
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NOTES
The exercise of jurisdiction by the state court was held to under-
mine and impair the right of Indian self government recognized in the
federal decisions beginning with Worcester. While the substantive test
of "infringement" was not concrete, the Supreme Court's message seemed
firm indeed: the state could exercise jurisdiction, unilaterally without
Congressional approval, only to the extent that the Indian tribes' in-
herent rights of self government were not diminished.
In 1968, Congress provided a new procedure whereby a state might
assume authority over reservation Indians. 2  Rather than continuing
to allow unilateral state action, the new provision required consent by
the Indian tribe over whom jurisdiction was to be exercised.26
The 1971 case of Kennerly v. District Court27 required the Supreme
Court to interpret both the 1953 and 1968 statutes. Kennerly involved
an attempt to transfer jurisdiction by the Blackfeet Tribal Council to
the State of Montana in 1967. There had been, however, no assumption
of jurisdiction by the state over the tribe through affirmative legislative
action. The Montana Supreme Court had ruled that the action by the
tribe was sufficient. 28 But the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In revers-
ing, the Court held that strict compliance with Congressional Acts was
required to assume jurisdiction. Since the transaction in question2 9 had
occurred prior to the enactment of the 1968 law permitting transfer of
jurisdiction by tribal consent, legislative action was required under the
1953 Act-and none had been taken.30 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the action by the Tribal Council was ineffective, since a tribal vote
would be the only form of consent which would comply with the 1968
law.31
When taken together, the Williams and Kennerly decisions have been
the subject of understandable confusion. It is clear from Kennerly that
if a state wishes to acquire jurisdiction over tribal Indians in com-
pliance with a Congressional enactment, all statutory requirements must
be met. If, however, Williams remained viable after Kennerly, it could
be argued that a state might assume Indian jurisdiction unilaterally
without Congressional permission if the state's action did not infringe
or impair the tribe's rights to govern itself. It could also be argued that
the substantive test set forth in Williams was the underlying considera-
tion for the assumption of jurisdiction over reservation Indians even if
Congressional formulae are followed. Additionally, it was unclear wheth-
er it was of any significance that the case involved Indians solely or
'Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 402(a), 82 Stat. 79, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
mId.
mKennerly v. District Court, supra note 1.
"Kennely v. District Court, 154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85 (1970).
"The suit concerned the payment of a debt incurred by an Indian on the reservation
to a non-Indian doing business thereon.
'
0Kennerly v. District Court, supra note 1 at 427
11d. at 429.
1974]
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Indians versus non-Indians. A March, 1973, decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court attempted to answer some of these questions.
In McClanahan v. State Tax Commissioner of Arizona,32 the Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a state could tax the income of a
reservation Indian. The Court unanimously held that the tax was unlaw-
ful as applied to tribal Indians because the state had no authority to
impose such a tax.33 In his review of the problem of Indian jurisdiction,
Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, wrote:
State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian re-trvation except where Congress has expressly provided
that State laws shall apply."
Discussing the applicability of Williams, he noted:
... It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test
have dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians . . . In
these situations, both the Tribe and the State could fairly claim an
interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams
test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State
could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government
would be affected. [Emphasis added.]'
Distinguishing Kennerly from Williams, Mr. Justice Marshall con-
cluded by noting that Kennerly expressly rejected the notion that the
state may ignore Congressional Acts and impose jurisdiction over reser-
vation Indians on the grounds that its action did not infringe upon
tribal rights. In attempting to secure jurisdiction over Indians on
reservations, the state must follow the dictates of federal legislation and
treaties. The state has no authority over matters solely involving tribal
Indians unless the Congressional formulae are followed.86
It is in the light of this background that the most recent decisions
of the Montana supreme court concerning the issue of civil jurisdiction
over reservation Indians must be viewed.
MONTANA'S POST-McCLANAHAN DECISIONS
THE CASES
Three recent decisions of the Montana supreme court indicate that
the question of state authority over tribal Indians remains unsettled
even after the efforts of Mr. Justice Marshall in McClanahan to provide
clarification.
In Securit!j State Bank v. Iierre3T the court faced an issue quite
similar to that in Kennerly. The defendant, an enrolled tribal Indian,
"McClanahan v. State Tax Commissioner, supra note 3.
uId. at 1259.
"Id. at 1261, citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
845 (1958).
5Id. at 1266.
Id.
87Security State Bank v. Pierre .... Mont..... ...... P.2d... 30 St. Rep. 482 (1973).
[Vol. 35
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borrowed money from a bank in an incorporated city located within the
boundaries of a reservation. The bank brought suit to collect the debt.
The Montana supreme court, noting the complexity of the Indian juris-
dictional question, held that Kennerly controlled:
. . . the State cannot exercise civil jurisdiction where it interferes
with the self-government of the Flathead tribe, or impairs a right
granted, reserved, or pre-empted by Congress."
The court felt compelled to reject an appeal that by denying juris-
diction in such a case Indians were thus granted a right to avoid their
legal responsibilities-a right not granted to non-Indians. 39 Citing Wor-
cester, the court held that until the concept of tribes as separate nations
is changed, it had no choice but to disallow jurisdiction.40
In State ex Rel. Mary Iron Bear,41 however, the court appeared
to initiate a slight of hand. Here the court found that the state
had jurisdiction over a divorce action brought by an Indian plain-
tiff against an Indian defendant. The court noted in reaching its
decision that the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribe had transferred jurisdiction
over divorce actions to the State of Montana in 1938.42 By construing
the Montana disclaimer clause43 to apply only to Indian rights over
property, the court held that the transfer of jurisdiction was valid. The
court noted that Kennerly was not controlling since that case had failed
to consider "residual" jurisdiction left in the state over Indians after
the tribe assumed self government. 44
McClanahan was distinguished by relying on McClanahan's sister case
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.4 5 There the Court had said that in
determining the application of state revenue laws to Indian tribes each
state-tribal relationship had to be examined in detail.46 Additionally, the
Montana court noted that Indians had the right to use state courts
especially when tribal courts were not exercising jurisdiction over the
action in question.4T Citing Williams, the court concluded that there
was no interference with tribal rights and no federal law was applicable
to divorce actions with which the state had to comply.48
81Id. at 653. Note that this is actually the Williams test.
'8Id.
'Old.
"State ex rel. Mary Iron Bear v. District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District of
the State of Montana, Mont ....... ...... P.2d ...... , 30 St. Rep. 482 (1973).
"id. at 483. According to the Kennerly criteria, this transfer of jurisdiction is
highly questionable.
"This construction is much narrower than the interpretation which the Montana
supreme court gave the disclaimer clause in State ex rel. McDonald v. District Court,
supra, note 10 at 81.
"State ex rel. Mary Iron Bear, supra note 41 at 487.
"Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 93 S.Ct. 1267 (1973).
"Id. at 1270.
'
7State ex rel. Mary Iron Bear, supra note 41 at 485, citing Poafbybitty v. Skelly Oil
Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968).
"8d. at 488.
1974]
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The court solidified its position in Bad Horse v. Bad Horse,49 another
case involving an Indian divorce action. In Bad Horse the court ruled
that to deny Indians who had been married under Montana law the
right to use Montana courts to dissolve such a marriage would violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 0 The
court held that the Williams infringement test was not applicable since
that test by virtue of McClanahan applied to non-Indian questions rather
than to cases involving Indian plaintiffs and defendants. 51 The court
ended by stating:
Only by throwing off the structures of Indian sovereignty can state
courts enter the arena and meet the problems of the modern Indian.
If Congress and the federal appellate courts have a better solution,
let them come forward."
A CRITIQUE
The Pierre decision seems to be a consistent if not grudging appli-
cation of the Williams interference test as restated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in McClanahan. The case involved non-Indian and Indian rights
in which both the state and the tribe had interests. Since exercise of
state jurisdiction would have infringed upon the role of the tribal
courts, the Williams test was applicable.
The Iron Bear and Bad Horse divorce cases, however, appear to
depart significantly from the precedent established by the federal de-
cisions. Both Iron Bear and Bad Horse involve Indian parties exclusively.
While McClanahan pointed out that the Williams interference test was
not to apply in such cases, that decision does not stand for the proposition
that the state has a free hand to exercise jurisdiction. Rather, it would
seem that the Supreme Court in McClanahan indicated that in cases
which involve the rights of Indians exclusively, the state has no authority
to impose its laws unless such power has been granted by Congress:
Since appellant is an Indian and since her income is derived wholly
from reservation sources her activity is totally within the sphere
which relevant treaties and statutes leave for the federal govern-
ment and for the Indians themselves. Appellee cites us no cases
holding that this legislation may be ignored simply because tribal
government has not been infringed. On the contrary, this Court
expressly rejected such a position only two years ago. [Citing
Kennerly.Y' [Brackets added.]
This language from McClanahan may be viewed narrowly as per-
taining only to taxation questions. But Mr. Justice Marshall's reliance
on the Kennerly decision, which had nothing to do with taxation, indi-
cates that the Court was making a broader policy statement. The entire
*'ad Horse v. Bad Horse- ...... Mont ....... ...... P.2d ...... , 31 St. Rep. 22 (1974).
'OId. at 25, citing U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
OId. at 26.
"Ild. at 28. A recent decision in the Tenth Circuit has leveled criticism at the doctrine
of Indian sovereignty. United States v. Mazure, 487 F.2d 14, 19 (10th Cir. 1973).
'McClanahan v. State Tax Commissioner, supra note 3 at 1266.
[Vol. 35
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line of federal law beginning with Worcester and including the dis-
claimer provisions in Montana's enabling act and the discussions in
Williams, Kennerly, and McClanahan seem to be centered on the notion
that where Indian rights only are involved, the state has no jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional problem presented in these cases is not one of
personal jurisdiction but one of subject matter jurisdiction. 54 Tribes and
their enrolled members have been treated as separate and independent
from the states. Unless federal law has changed this relationship, the
state has no authority to unilaterally impose its jurisdiction over the
tribe or its members. If the federal law is so viewed, there is no "residual"
jurisdiction in the state nor is it possible for the individual tribal mem-
ber to confer jurisdiction on the state without complying with federal
legislation.5"
The Montana decisions point out that the federal cases and statutes
do not say the same thing to every reader. Indeed, the decisions of the
Supreme Court with regard to Indian jurisdiction are not crystalline
in their clarity. If one desires, it is possible to distinguish almost every
case from its forerunner or successor on the basis of factual differences
as well as by real or imagined legal distinctions.
The Montana decisions raise difficult issues that deserve resolution.
Where are Indians to turn if the tribal courts do not exercise jurisdiction
over certain actions that involve Indian rights? Does the argument of
infringement have vitality when the reservation Indian walks into the
state court granting personal jurisdiction? In Bad Horse, the Montana
supreme court has issued a challenge to the Congress or the federal
courts to provide answers to these questions. In light of the issues
raised and the variance which seems to exist between the rulings of the
Montana courts and the Supreme Court with regard to the tests to be
applied in determining when a state may have authority over reservation
Indians, it is imperative that the gauntlet be taken up.
"In Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256, 259 (N.D. 1973), the North Dakota supreme
course has taken the position that unless the state and Indian tribes follow Congres-
sional statutory directions, the state has no subject matter jurisdiction over tribal
Indians. The court held that this lack of jurisdiction was not a denial of equal
protection.
11d.; accord, White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973).
1974] NOTES
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